Vladimir Putin arrived in Mongolia on September 2ndthe primary visit of the Russian President to a member state of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since the authority has issued an arrest warrant for his arrest in 2023. While officially Soviet-Mongolian military victory In the Second World War, Putin's visit will test the small Central Asian country's policy of neutrality and the influence of international institutions.

Mongolia, a land of justice 3.3 million people However, it has an enormous geographical territory and has long conducted its foreign policy within the shadow of Russia and China, with whom it has extensive historical and economic ties.

The country has sought to strengthen its independence from its more powerful neighbours by establishing friendly relations with so-called third neighbor Countries comparable to the United States, Germany, Japan and South Korea.

With this approach, Mongolia is attempting to carve out a distinct segment for itself on the international stage and present itself as a neutral diplomatic meeting place. Ulaanbaatar DialogueFor example, it’s a possibility for countries within the region and other invited nations, including the United States and EU Member States, to debate problems with Climate change, regional security and demanding minerals.

As Scholars of Mongolia and ChinaWe attended the last such dialogue in June 2024 and witnessed Mongolia's diplomatic efforts firsthand. It's a technique that has worked for the country, but as events like Putin's visit show, it will possibly be a difficult balancing act.

A closely observed visit

The timing of Putin’s trip is officially linked to history. It marks each the eighty fifth anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol – during which joint Soviet-Mongolian forces defeated Japanese troops in World War II – and the Establishment of the National Railway Company of Mongolia of each countries 75 years ago.

But it’s a third historic milestone, the fifth anniversary of a comprehensive Russian-Mongolian strategic partnershipwhich underlines the importance of the visit from a contemporary geopolitical perspective.

In addition to the friendly relations with “third neighbors,” Mongolia continues to take care of close relations with Moscow, although Putin is taken into account a pariah by many parts of the international community. Just recently, in July, Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh met with Putin in Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

But Putin’s visit now – the first he has brought into the country since 2019 – poses a challenge for Mongolia because it seeks to safeguard its commitments and alliances with the Western-led international orderwhich incorporates the ICC, and its desire to stay friends with its powerful neighbours.

Few things testify to this diplomatic balancing act like Mongolia’s membership within the International Criminal Court, which issued an arrest warrant against Putin for his alleged role within the illegal deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia. Ukraine has urged Mongolia is to arrest Putin, citing the ICC’s founding treaty, which Roman Statutewhich instructs member states to take motion when individuals against whom a court order has been issued enter their territory.

However, the ICC lacks an efficient enforcement mechanism and member states could also exempted from carrying out arrests if it conflicts with certain contractual obligations or the diplomatic immunity offered to a different party.

Putin’s visit is meant to indicate how little could be done to maintain Moscow in check. Given the facility imbalance between the states, Mongolia will likely show how far it’s willing to go to accommodate its powerful neighbor.

Mongolia as a “third neighbour”

For almost 70 years, Mongolia was closely allied with the Soviet Union. But the collapse of communism and the following geopolitical realignment of the post-war order forced the country to vary its economic and political relations.

This made Mongolia the one former communist state in Asia that Introduction of a democratic political system and an open economyIt gained favor with the United States and other Western countries, who viewed the country as a model for the region.

Putin's expected trip is just the most recent in a string of high-level state visits in recent times, as Mongolia strives to take care of close ties with its neighbors while expanding partnerships with other countries.

So far, Mongolia has received heads of state or foreign ministers from the United States, Slovenia, the Philippines, Belarus, the United Kingdom and Germany in 2024. In 2023, Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene traveled to the United States and met with Vice President Kamala Harrisand to China to see President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Qiang.

The two French presidents Emmanuel Macron And Pope Francis recently visited Ulaanbaatar.

Mongolia cannot escape geography

While Ulan Bator's soft power efforts have won it sympathy and friends world wide, they aren’t as vital as its geographical location. As a landlocked country between Russia and China, Mongolia is defenseless against the whims of its two giant neighbors.

Mongolia depends on Russia for its petrol and diesel supplies and for much of its electricity. In addition, Mongolia is Old agreements from the Soviet eraRussia holds 50% of the shares in several vital infrastructure and mining projects in Mongolia. In particular, Russia is a partner within the Mongolian railway systemwhich has gained importance as a trade corridor between China and Russia and between China and Europe.

Mongolia fears a disruption of the fuel supply and the transport network when Russia, within the midst of a war, puts its own energy needs above the interests of its neighbours, regardless of how close those ties could also be.

Similarly, Mongolia relies on China for nearly all of its non-energy imports, including food, consumer goods and manufactured products. And China is the destination for 90 percent of Mongolia's exports, mainly coal and copper.

Both Russia and China have used their economic and political strength as leverage against Mongolia up to now, as they proved to be slights, comparable to China cutting off trade and a serious loan in 2016 in protest against a visit of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia.

Mongolia and the brand new Chinese-Russian alignment

Mongolia and other Central Asian states face recent challenges Russia and China are moving closer together politically and economically.

Mongolia played the role of a Buffer state between the Soviet Union and China and took advantage of the rivalry between the 2 superpowers to attain and maintain its independent status.

But the growing friendship between China and Russia – highlighted by Putin and Xi’s Declaration of a partnership without borderlines in February 2022, just days before Russian troops invaded Ukraine – raises the query of whether China and Russia will begin to work together to realize much more influence over Mongolia and other smaller states within the region.

It is these geopolitical concerns that Ulaanbaatar may bear in mind during Putin's visit. Even though Mongolia is affected by the sanctions against Russia, Transport and business connections disruptedThe country has stayed out of international confrontations with Moscow.

Like China, Mongolia also frequently renounces United Nations Resolutions condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, as an indication that Mongolia stays faithful to its policy as a 3rd neighbor, it was also careful to not violate the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies against Russia.

While Mongolia recognizes the importance of Putin's visit to maintaining good relations and fuel supplies to the country, it’s also concerned about how the visit and the expected non-enforcement of ICC sanctions could damage the country's popularity with global institutions and powers outside the region.

In a changing world order, Mongolia is doing its best to preserve its independence by emphasizing its role as a neutral state and friend to all. But visits like Putin's show how difficult that endeavor could be.

Shortly after his trip to North Korea last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed within the Vietnamese capital Hanoi, as an old friend. His 22-hour state visit took place at the very best level and led to a Number of agreements in the sphere of energy and science and technology. There was also talk in regards to the once close allies Cooperation in the sphere of defence and security.

In some ways, this expression of affection will not be surprising. After all, it was the communists in North Vietnam, with Soviet support, who won the war in 1975 and united with Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) and the South.

Many members of Vietnam's current political, economic and academic elite also worked or studied within the Soviet Union over the next decade and are very aware of the close relationship between the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

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But the greeting of old comrades and the litany of gestures of growing cooperation raised questions and concerns. Should Putin's warm welcome in Hanoi worry the West after years of cooperation and booming integration with the US and Western markets?

We don't think so. While the present leaders of the CPV and other elites were shaped by the peak of Soviet-Vietnamese ties, this will not be the case for Vietnam's younger generations.

The country's 100 million inhabitants have a really different – and more Western – orientation. The leaders of Vietnam's booming digital economy, for instance, mostly studied within the West and speak English slightly than Russian.

The United States exerts far more influence on Vietnam than the proven Russian friends do. This is very true for the generations born around or after the introduction of a series of market-based reforms in 1986 often called Đổi Mới. For most of those people, Russia is unknown beyond history lessons and a number of provinces where it invests or sends tourists.

Their coming of age took place under the influence of growing Western popularity. There has been a dramatic decline in Russia-related courses in Vietnamese schools and universities, and the Russian language is far less in demand than French and JapaneseIn contrast, the rise of international education in Vietnam was marked by the mass import of Western content, comparable to the iGCSE curriculum and the SAT exam.

Go west, young man

For young Vietnamese, including the little children of politicians, business and academic leaders educated in Russia, education and work within the West have grow to be the norm. Our own researchpublished in 2021, compared the backgrounds of Vietnam's digital leaders – most of whom were born during or after the collapse of the Soviet Union – with the founders of leading Vietnamese corporations in additional traditional sectors comparable to coffee, furniture and steel.

A have a look at the transnational experiences of each groups of founders reveals a remarkable difference: Vietnam's booming startups are predominantly run by returnees from the West slightly than from the previous Soviet Union.

The founders of Vietnam's top-performing technology corporations are 15 times more more likely to have U.S. experience than their older counterparts, and so they are 35 times more more likely to be graduates of American universities than the leaders of huge, traditional Vietnamese corporations.

The entrepreneurs who’re creating recent wealth in Vietnam and setting the direction and pace of the country's cultural norms, economic growth and technological connections have significantly different experiences than the older generation.

This generational shift towards a Western background, each in business and beyond, leads us to suspect that Putin's state visit may very well be a largely ceremonial affair. We see the Vietnamese leadership rolling out the red carpet for Putin as a part of their long-standing “Bamboo diplomacy”through which Vietnam cooperates pragmatically with all powers.

For two related reasons, it’s unlikely to reflect any deeper ambitions or future intentions for the country to maneuver away from bamboo diplomacy.

First, over the past 30 years, the West has built a robust and tangible base in all elements of cultural, economic and technological life in Vietnam – from the metropolis of Ho Chi Minh City within the south to Hanoi within the north. In fact, Hanoi even seems Welcome to the West In terms of security, there may be a contrast to Vietnam's stock of Russian-made weapons.

Second, Vietnam's political leadership will increasingly be crammed with Western-educated returnees, and because the few generations of Vietnamese elites with strong affinities with Russia thin out, commitment to agreements with their old comrades will even diminish.

Not to say the country’s already highly westernized economy, which is driven by FTA And investment from the West, supported by the growing community of Western-educated business people.

Perhaps the clearest indication of Vietnam's commitment to its bamboo diplomacy is the undeniable fact that just three days after Putin's departure, the CPV welcomed a US Deputy Secretary of State, Daniel Kritenbrink. The visit to the American friend reaffirmed the “comprehensive strategic partner” Status of the USA in Vietnam, which puts it on a par with China and Russia.

With media coverage still dominated by the Ukraine War, one might assume that Vladimir Putin's machinations in Eastern Europe are focused exclusively on Ukraine. And perhaps you're right. After all, why should Russia's president must become involved in states where domestic politicians seem greater than willing to do his job for him?

This is the situation that’s currently developing in Georgia. The country's ruling political coalition, Kartuli Otsneba (Georgian Dream), pursues a policy of spiritual nationalism and social conservatism that aligns Georgia with the social policies of Putin and the top of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow.

More secular Georgians and those that favor closer ties with the EU and NATO fear a creeping Russification of society. These fears crystallized when the Govt tried to pass The so-called “foreign agents” law sparked widespread protests on the streets of the state capital Tbilisi in March 2023.

The proposed laws was Modeled on a Russian law The aim is to limit the quantity of funding that NGOs and other externally funded organizations can accept. Opposition to this measure was fueled by fears that its adoption would allow the Georgian government to ban cultural and social projects deemed incompatible with “Georgian values.” This would potentially result in increased harassment of everyone from the LGBTQ+ community to single parents Vegans and vegetarians.

It was also widely assumed that other elements of Russian laws would follow if this primary law was enacted. The bill was struck by the strength of public opinion withdrawn in May 2023. But the suspicion that Russia is influencing the actions of some Georgian politicians stays.

Cultural approach

The crackdown on culture began when Thea Tsukuliani died called Tsukuliani was Minister of Culture, Sports and Youth in March 2021. Tsukuliani was previously justice minister and showed no apparent interest in Georgian history and culture.

On her appointment, Tsukuliani announced that she would settle in a set on the Georgian National Museum in Tbilisi as an alternative of the same old ministry office. She reportedly had her eye on a wing of the museum that had recently reopened as a natural history gallery.

Since this collection has not been open to the general public for several years, the curatorial team resisted the suggestion that it needs to be closed again soon. Instead, Tsukuliani moved into the identical suite on a distinct floor, dispossessing the National Geographic team that had signed a contract for the space.

In this fashion, I used to be made aware of the situation in Georgia long before it gained wider attention. I received a message from a colleague informing me that a project I used to be doing with the Georgian National Museum could now not hold educational events for college children since the room we had just renovated had change into an emergency office for workers became National Geographic.

Then, on May 24, 2022, the cultural cleansing began 22 employees were fired. The 22 had one thing in common: that they had it expressed unrest concerning the apparent politicization of Georgia's cultural heritage and argued that archeology and related disciplines mustn’t be controlled by the Georgian Dream.

Punishment of dissenting opinions

Those fired were followed by waves of their colleagues – administrators and accountants were targeted, as were researchers, archaeologists and curators. More than until September 2022 70 employees on the Georgian National Museum had lost their positions. Anyone who dared to specific solidarity was informed that they were failing of their work duties dismissed with immediate effect.

This quickly had an impact on international research partners. For example, when archaeologists got here to Georgia, they found that they existed no permits for the excavation, because the staff of the issuing body had also been “reorganized”. Within a couple of months, the threat had spread to other cultural staff, resembling theater and theater staff Movie Industry sectors.

The laid-off museum staff unionized and attracted national media attention. In August 2022, when the primary cases of wrongful dismissal got here to court, it was the Ministry of Culture as viewed Illegally dismissing employees of the Georgian National Museum and other galleries and museums.

Good news, you may think – but you'd be unsuitable. So far, the state has been asked to pay the worker several months' wages as compensation. However, the Ministry of Culture was not obliged to reinstate the employee in his previous role, meaning generations of institutional and skilled knowledge were lost.

Many octogenarians stayed long after their retirement to bridge the gap between the “lost generations.” fled post-communist Georgia for the USA or Europe. They had worked for lower than £50 a month to pass on their knowledge to a brand new generation: the “born free” who had never experienced communism.

Over the past decade, the older group had begun to consider they may entrust their work to this recent generation. But it was apparently the oldest and youngest who were particularly affected by this purge.

Election hopes and fears

Georgians will go to the polls again in November 2024 to elect a brand new government. Georgian Dream, which has led a governing coalition since 2012, is looking for an extension of its mandate.

My colleagues, still sitting within the Georgian National Museum, are torn between hope that their ordeal will soon be over and despair that Georgian Dream appears to be heading in the right direction to stay in power . If it wins again, Georgia will feel like nothing can stop the crawl Russification of Georgian society that this facilitates cultural censorship.

For now, Georgian academics, writers, museum staff and filmmakers appear to agree that their best hope lies in a Ukrainian victory that weakens Russia – and thereby weakens its stranglehold on Georgia's ruling class.