Quotes from former President Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter, the farmer, president and Nobel Peace Prize winner, dies at the age of 100

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The escalating conflict between Israel and Iran in recent months is commonly explained as an additional expansion of the Israeli war against Hamas within the Gaza Strip. Hamas maintains close relations with Iranand each share the goal of destroying the Jewish state.

But there may be more to it than that.

As a security scientist who has researched Conflicts within the Middle East for over 20 yearsI’d argue that US foreign policy within the region has failed in a decade to contain Iranian ambitions and, quite the opposite, has contributed significantly to the present escalation.

As might be seen from the recent Events along Israel’s northern borderWashington's ability to project power and protect American interests within the Middle East has declined so dramatically since 2010 that Iran has little concern about the results of its proxies launching attacks on U.S. forces and direct attacks on U.S. allies akin to Israel.

Iranian victories

The government of Iran, a Shiite state in a Sunni Muslim region, is expanding its regional influence by funding and militarily supporting violent proxy organizations in neighboring countries. These groups, in turn, attack and destabilize these countries.

Over the last decade, this clever strategy has Iran is prone to grow to be probably the most influential superpower within the Middle East.

Until the early 2010s, Hezbollah, the Shiite political and military group that Iran represents within the region, was the country's only stronghold. Promoted in Lebanon within the early Nineteen EightiesIran’s current allies include the Houthi rebels in Yemen and a loyal Network of Shiite militias in IraqIn Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has allowed Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to massive military presence.

Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas invaded Israel and triggered the Gaza War, these groups have directly attacked Israel, American military bases and US civilian assets within the region over 170 timesThe political and military sovereignty of Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq is so eroded that some American officials considered them Iran's puppet regime.

During the identical period, Iran's military nuclear program has reached its most advanced stage. In July 2024, six years after the Trump administration withdrew from the international nuclear agreement US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Iran was weeks away from slowing down Iranian weapons development. to equip its huge and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

Misunderstandings, containment and simplified diplomacy

Despite Iran's quite a few military and political advances over the past decade, the American government has consistently underestimated its ambitions for regional dominance. At the identical time, for my part, it has overestimated the effectiveness of long-standing US strategies.gentle power” Policy towards Iran: Containment and de-escalation.

To avoid an escalation of the conflict within the Middle East, Washington is prioritizing measures that avoid a military confrontation with Iran at almost any cost. Instead Curbing Iran’s growing regional influenceThe US has banned the sale of weapons and technology to Iran, imposed strict economic sanctions, frozen Iranian financial assets and diplomatically isolated the Iranian government.

Nevertheless, Iran's influence continues to grow. In my view, this shows that containment and de-escalation cannot deter a regime whose core policy is formed by fundamentalist ideology. The Iranian leaders invoke religious beliefs to justify their commitment to violent struggle, their regional superiority and the destruction of Israel.

“If Allah wills, there will be no Zionist regime in 25 years,” said Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneiin 2015, wherein he described the fight to destroy Israel as an issue of “jihadist morality.”

I imagine that diplomacy, negotiations, and legal and economic sanctions are the preferable solutions to most global conflicts. But modern history shows that these measures cannot bring about political change in undemocratic, fundamentalist regimes that disregard the foundations of world diplomacy – consider Nazi Germany, North Korea and the Afghan Taliban regime.

How to not cope with proxies

My Scholarship for terrorist groups suggests that the US has also made mistakes in coping with Iran's proxies. Rather than addressing them collectively as a part of a hostile network, the US treats each proxy as an isolated actor operating in a selected location and seeks to contain or de-escalate that specific threat.

In Yemen, for instance, the US has failed to stop Iran-backed Houthi rebels from seizing territory and essentially ousting the federal government. The Biden administration even pressured US ally Saudi Arabia in 2021 to Stop militarily strengthening the country's legitimate leaders of their bloody struggle for power. After the beginning of the Gaza war, the Houthis, at Iran’s behest, began Dozens of missiles fired at Western-flagged ships within the Red Sea.

It was not until early 2024 that the US confronted the Houthis. military retaliatory strikes on Houthi bases in Yemen.

In Iraq, the United States was for a very long time prepared to overlook the undeniable fact that Iran supported the Iraqi Shiite militias fighting against the terrorist militia “Islamic State”, so long as these forces proceed to take part in the war against the Islamic StateIgnoring the long-term consequences of their growing strength has its price: over the past yr, these Iraqi militias have committed quite a few American military bases within the region.

And in Syria, despite Iran’s growing influence within the wake of the Syrian civil war, the United States has continued to support Anti-Assad rebels and pro-democratic Kurdish forces.

Collapse of American deterrence

All these failed foreign policies culminated within the collapse of American deterrence within the Middle East. Simply put, the United States now not has enough power there to finish Iranian hostilities.

In April 2024 after Israel killed senior officials within the Iranian embassy complex in SyriaIran launched one in every of the biggest missile attacks in historywhich fired over 300 rockets at Israel – the primary direct attack on IsraelHowever, it has had only minor consequences, especially Economic sanctions and diplomatic outcry.

The US, which had called on Israel's Middle East allies to shoot down most Iranian missiles, again preferred to dam a meaningful response. The Biden administration called the undeniable fact that few missiles hit Israel a “victory” and insisted that the US Israel wouldn’t take part any retaliation against Iran.

America’s deep aversion to escalation became even clearer when the targeted killings of high-ranking leaders of Hezbollah and HamasEnd of July 2024 Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut, Lebanon, and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in a bomb attack on a government guesthouse in Iran. Iran blamed Israel for Haniyeh's assassination. The New York Times reported This assessment was also reached by “several US officials who requested anonymity.”

Iran immediately swore revenge.

For months, the US had put pressure on Israel to precision-based military operations to avoid further civilian casualties within the Gaza war, which has almost 40,000 people in the primary six months. But when Israel finally appeared to accomplish that and eliminate certain terrorists chargeable for the deaths of Israelis and Americans, American policymakers feared that such cross-border attacks could lead on to a regional escalation.

If the United States wants to realize long-term peace within the Middle East, it must first acknowledge the failures of the past decade. The facts support my conclusion that Iran is an enemy that can not be easily deterred, contained, or de-escalated.

BEIRUT — Hamas' top political leader was killed in a dawn airstrike within the Iranian capital on Wednesday, Iran and the militant group said, blaming Israel for the surprise killing that threatened to escalate right into a full-scale regional war. Iran's supreme leader vowed revenge on Israel.

The assassination was potentially explosive due to its goal, timing and the choice to hold it out in Tehran amid the region's volatile, intertwined conflicts. Most dangerous was the potential to push Iran and Israel into direct confrontation if Iran retaliated. The United States and other countries sought to stop a bigger, deadlier conflict.

In a press release on his official website, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said revenge was “our duty” and that Israel had “prepared itself a harsh punishment” by killing “a valued guest in our house.”

Israel and Iran are bitter regional rivals who went into war earlier this 12 months when Israel attacked the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April. Iran retaliated and Israel countered with an unprecedented exchange of blows on one another's territory. But international efforts managed to stop the vicious cycle before it spiraled uncontrolled.

Haniya's murder could also prompt Hamas to withdraw from negotiations on a ceasefire and the discharge of hostages within the ten-month Gaza war, which US mediators say are making progress.

And it could further fuel already growing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, which international diplomats have been attempting to bring under control after a rocket attack over the weekend killed 12 young people within the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.

Israel conducted a Rare strike on Tuesday evening within the Lebanese capital It said a senior Hezbollah commander allegedly behind the rocket attack had been killed. Hezbollah, which denied any involvement within the Golan attack, said on Wednesday it was trying to find the body of Fouad Shukur within the rubble of the constructing hit in a Beirut suburb. The Lebanese Health Ministry said three women and two children were killed within the attack.

There was no immediate response from the White House to Haniyeh's death. A key query was whether Israel had informed the United States, its most significant ally, prematurely.

Asked about Haniyeh's killing, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “This is something we were not aware of and were not involved in.” Speaking to Channel News Asia, Blinken said he didn’t want to take a position on the impact on ceasefire efforts. “But I can tell you that the need for a ceasefire and the importance that this has for everyone remains.”

A senior Hamas official, Khalil al-Hayya, told Iranian journalists that whoever succeeds Haniyeh will pursue “the same vision” regarding negotiations to finish the war – and proceed the identical policy of resistance against Israel.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said he still had hope for a diplomatic solution on the Israeli-Lebanese border. “I don't think war is inevitable,” he said. “I think there is always room and opportunity for diplomacy, and I would like to see the parties take advantage of those opportunities.”

But international diplomats attempting to defuse tensions are alarmed. One Western diplomat, whose country is striving to stop an escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, said the attacks in Beirut and Tehran had “almost destroyed” hopes of a ceasefire in Gaza and will plunge the Middle East right into a “devastating regional war.” The diplomat spoke on condition of anonymity to debate the fragile situation.

Spokesmen for the Israeli military and government declined to comment. Israel often doesn’t comment on assassinations by its Mossad intelligence agency or attacks on other countries.

In a press release from his office, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said Israel didn’t want war after the attack on the Hezbollah commander in Beirut, “but we are preparing for all possibilities.” He didn’t mention the killing of Haniyeh, and it was not mentioned in a U.S.-provided summary of his phone call with Austin.

Haniyeh's killing abroad got here after Israel had up to now did not kill the highest Hamas leadership within the Gaza Strip, which is taken into account the predominant person chargeable for planning the October 7 attack.

Haniyeh left Gaza in 2019 and lived in exile in Qatar. Israel has targeted Hamas figures in Lebanon and Syria in the course of the war, but pursuing Haniyeh in Iran was way more sensitive. Israel has been lively there up to now: It is suspected of conducting a years-long assassination campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists. In 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a top Iranian military nuclear scientist, was killed by a remote-controlled machine gun while traveling in a automotive outside Tehran.

During Haniyeh's final hours in Iran, an in depth ally of Hamas, he smiled and clapped on the inauguration ceremony of recent President Masoud Pezeshkian. Associated Press photos showed him sitting next to leaders of the militant Palestinian Islamic Jihad group and Hezbollah, and Iranian media showed him and Pezeshkian embracing. Haniyeh had previously met with Khamenei.

Hours later, the attack hit a residence utilized by Haniyeh in Tehran, killing him, Hamas said. One of his bodyguards was killed, Iranian officials said. Hamas official Al-Hayya later said on Iranian state television that Haniyeh was killed by a rocket.

Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard warned that Israel would face a “harsh and painful response” from Iran and its allies within the region. An influential Iranian parliamentary committee for national security and foreign affairs was as a result of hold an emergency meeting on the attack on Wednesday.

Hamas' military wing said in a press release that Haniyeh's assassination “extends the fighting into a new dimension and will have serious repercussions for the entire region.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that Israel will proceed its devastating campaign in Gaza until Hamas is destroyed. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, greater than 39,300 Palestinians have been killed and greater than 90,900 injured by Israel's bombings and offensives in Gaza. The figures don’t distinguish between civilians and fighters.

After months of shelling, Hamas has shown that its fighters can still operate in Gaza and fire rockets into Israel, but it surely is unclear whether it’s capable of step up its attacks in retaliation for Haniyeh's killing.

Rather, the impact could possibly be regional. In addition to direct retaliation against Israel, Iran could increase its attacks through its allies, including a coalition of Iranian-backed groups often known as the “Axis of Resistance.” These include Hezbollah, Hamas, mainly Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi rebels who control large parts of Yemen.

In a show of support for Hamas, Hezbollah exchanges almost day by day fire with Israel across the Israeli-Lebanese border in a simmering but deadly conflict that has repeatedly threatened to escalate into open war. The Houthis, in addition to Iraqi and Syrian militias, have also fired rockets and drones at Israel and American bases within the region, but most have been intercepted.

Four members of the Iran-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah were killed in an attack on Tuesday evening southwest of the Iraqi capital Baghdad. This militia had previously attacked US bases, in line with the Iraqi militia coalition Popular Mobilization Forces, which accused the US of being behind the attack.

A U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity in accordance with regulations, said American forces had conducted a “defensive airstrike” against militants who “posed a threat to U.S. and coalition forces due to recent attacks in Iraq and Syria….”

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Associated Press writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran, Iran, David Rising in Bangkok and Jon Gambrell in Ubud, Indonesia, contributed to this report.

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For more AP reports, see https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war

Originally published: July 31, 2024 at 9:53 am

While Americans are inundated with news in regards to the seemingly never-ending election campaign between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, several other elections took place last week.

In the UK, Labour defeated the Tories to take power after 14 years in opposition. In France, President Emmanuel Macron was given a small reprieve after his party and a coalition of leftists joined forces to forestall Marine Le Pen's far-right Rassemblement National from gaining control of the French National Assembly.

But probably the most interesting election, with probably the most surprising final result, took place in Iran, a rustic not exactly known totally free and fair democratic processes. A little bit-known reformist lawmaker, Masoud Pezeshkian, defeated a pillar of Iran's conservative political establishment by a whopping 3 million votes. What many had expected to be one other tightly controlled election through which the conservative candidate would win handily turned out as a substitute to be a transparent rejection of the system at large.

Faced with the alternative of either voting for ultra-conservative hardliner Saeed Jalili, known for his theological tirades, or a politician who advocates easing social restrictions and opening as much as the West, greater than 16 million Iranian voters selected the latter.

Sudden alternative

Not much is thought about Pezeshkian and his politics. A heart surgeon, health minister under former reformist President Mohammad Khatami, and a member of parliament for nearly 20 years, Pezeshkian sought the office despite great difficulties. In fact, he knows firsthand how difficult it’s to interrupt into Iran's national political scene; in 2021, he was barred from running for president by the Guardian Council, an unelected body of jurists, clerics, and officials appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to be certain that candidates are staunch supporters of the Islamic Republic. That presidential campaign was a staged affair, with the sphere clear for Ebrahim Raisi, Khamenei's loyal protégé, to assume the presidency.

However, Raisi's death in a helicopter crash in May meant that Iran had to arrange elections in a brief time period. Again, many candidates were barred from running, but Pezeshkian was allowed to run. Khamenei likely wanted more Iranians to vote after voter turnout was so low within the last election. In the 2024 parliamentary election earlier this 12 months, only 41% of Iranians solid their ballots, a dismal figure that caused considerable concern to the Supreme Leader's Office. Allowing a reform-minded candidate would presumably encourage more Iranians – particularly within the cities and amongst young people – to participate. If that was the aim, it worked to some extent – about 50% of eligible voters participated.

Pezeshkian was also a protected bet. Although he ran as a moderate candidate in search of to limit the morality police, the nice doctor is hardly a reformist revolutionary. In fact, Pezeshkian is a product of the system and has been an energetic participant in it because the mid-Nineties, when he was first appointed deputy foreign minister under the Khatami government. While his old boss Khatami enjoyed shaking up the Islamic Republic's political system within the hopes of creating it more democratic (Khatami was thwarted by Khamenei and the safety services), Pezeshkian is more cautious and seems to know that an Iranian leader is not going to get far unless he’s incredibly patient. He must also play his role and reaffirm his loyalty to the supreme leader and the Islamic Republic as an entire, something Pezeshkian did continuously during his transient presidential campaign.

Energetic campaign

Nevertheless, the long-serving MP said all the best things through the election campaign. In particular, through the presidential debates he stressed that it was absolutely unacceptable for cops to beat women because they dressed a certain way. He berated the Raisi government (without naming it) as an incompetent bunch that couldn't even talk its way out of a paper bag. He berated his opponent Jalili for being completely unfit to steer anything, let alone a rustic whose economy is constrained by US sanctions, whose currency is losing value and where inflation is around 40 percent. And he mocked Jalili for making economic guarantees that he didn’t have the obligatory experience to maintain.

Pezeshkian also disagreed on foreign policy issues. Unlike Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator who blocked diplomacy during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, Pezeshkian argued that Iran could only revive its economy if it resumed nuclear talks with the United States so as to lift Washington's sanctions. Not surprisingly, Pezeshkian's most vocal supporter was Mohammad Javad Zarif, a former Iranian foreign minister who was instrumental in getting the 2015 Iran nuclear deal across the finish line.

Iran could have some interesting years ahead.

The presidential elections in Iran on June 2 could offer Tehran the chance to force a fresh start in foreign policy after years of accelerating warmongering. Indeed, a central campaign issue was the extent to which the candidates would – or wouldn’t – commit to more Engagement with the West.

While the supreme leader – the very best religious and political authority within the country – is the final word arbiter in coping with international powers, the Iranian president has influence in a political system during which several centers of power.

The presidential election, which was Death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024, comes at a time when Iran is grappling with major, interconnected national, regional and global problems. The country's economy continues to suffer from international sanctions, the most recent round of which collected by the US and UK in April 2024 after Iran launched a direct attack on Israel.

Sanctions should not the one way the West can put pressure on Tehran: Cyber ​​War, light power And Military power are also available to the countries. But Iran’s activities – comparable to the financing of militant proxy groups, Circumventing sanctions over China and Russia and the further development of national nuclear and missile programs – have continued unabated in recent times.

As experts for US foreign policy and IranWe consider this raises a very important query: are the efforts of the US and its allies to discourage Iran having any effect? ​​And could a change of president provide a possibility for the West to rethink its approach to Iran?

The limits of diplomacy

Since Iran's Islamic Revolution 1979The United States and Iran shouldn’t have official diplomatic relations. But that doesn’t mean that there aren’t any diplomatic efforts. In fact, there are unofficial channels, comparable to the US's cooperation with the Swiss government.

But US diplomatic efforts with Iran are complicated at one of the best of times. They are vulnerable to disruption if the US or Iran changes leadership, and have only turn out to be tougher as Iran has grown closer with China and Russia.

The result was a inconsistent diplomatic policy on the subject of how the US and the West usually take care of Tehran.

This is partly a consequence of the increasing more influence within the Middle East and deepening their economic and strategic Relations with Tehran. Russia has also Military, politically And economically Connections to Iran.

This has weakened the impact of Western diplomacy; Iran simply doesn’t feel compelled to achieve an agreement with the United States and its allies on its security interests.

The Joint Comprehensive Action Planthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 2015, but abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018 is a first-rate example. Western leaders tried to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but were unable to steer Iran to cooperate after President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

Despite this lack of progress, channels of communication between the United States and Iran remain open. Following Israel's attack on the Iranian embassy complex in Syria The USA signalled clearly According to Tehran, the country was not involved within the operation, apparently to stop a retaliatory strike against US interests within the region.

Nevertheless, Iran has little Incentive to barter Given the inconsistent, unpredictable policies of the US leadership.

In the meantime upcoming US-Saudi security pact could push Iran even further away from the West and closer to the sphere of influence of China and Russia.

Ultimately, the US and Europe have two goals: to stop Iran from constructing a nuclear weapon and to contain the conflicts it sponsors within the Middle East.

But each goals seem unattainable up to now, because Iran continuation, Unabated uranium enrichment and be attacks happen often throughout the Middle East.

In the past, Iran has given diplomacy a likelihood, fearing that a scarcity of willingness could play into the hands of Western hawks who push for military strikes against Iran.

A brand new reform-minded president in Iran could mobilize support for engaging in diplomatic negotiations, but he would likely need the blessing of the supreme leader to accomplish that.

In any case next president is looking more of a hardliner On the side of the supreme leader. And while they face pressure at home and abroad to adopt a more conciliatory tone, they may as well double down on their current policies.

Peddling gentle power

As confidence in a diplomatic solution wanes, the United States and its allies are resorting to other means to place pressure on Iran.

Western intelligence services conducted various Information campaigns And Cyber ​​operations The aim is to undermine trust within the Iranian leadership and its strategies for the region.

For example, in 2010 there was a joint American-Israeli cyber operation called Stuxnet compromised the nuclear material enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran, by interfering with and disrupting the conventional operation of the centrifuge while concurrently signaling to operators that they were operating normally.

Such operations exist to this present day in response to Iran's failure to deal with US security concerns about nuclear proliferation and its anti-Western activities within the region.

Tehran can also be conducting cyber warfare. In 2023, a US report warned that Iran is prone to increase its use of aggressive cyber operations to attain its political goals. This includes the usage of government-sponsored proxies to spread destructive malware and ransomware.

The Iranian presidential elections are happening against a backdrop of domestic discontent – ​​and offer the West a possibility to make use of one other tactic to place pressure on Tehran: propaganda against the regime.

In order to cut back support for the prevailing government and sow discontent among the many Iranian public, independent radio and news channels supported by the US and its European allies have deliberately the Iranian public with anti-Iranian government messages And increased local protests.

Recourse to sanctions

The Iranian presidential candidates have by and huge promised Easing sanctionspossibly to counter the messages being sent by the West. Such efforts suggest that the candidates are sensitive to the sanctions. disproportionate impact on strange Iranians, especially the center class.

In recent years, the US and Europe have tightened sanctions against Iran for various reasons. Iran's repressive response to the 2022 protests following the death of a young woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, in police custody triggered quite a few sanctions from the European Union. Most recently in April, the USA and Great Britain Sanctions to discourage Iran of the escalation of the conflict within the Middle East and Sale of drones to Russia.

Sanctions comparable to those imposed through the US Maximum Pressure Campaign During Trump's presidency, they’ve undoubtedly exerted pressure on Iran's economic system and trade, and their influence will be seen within the country's high inflation rates and economic downturn.

However, some analysts consider that the campaign has Iran hardens and undermine diplomatic efforts.

Others consider that the sanctions have had no effect, considering Russia And China have provided relief by granting Iran access to their markets.

While the sanctions have demonstrably weakened the Iranian economy, their success in implementing the broader strategy of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table – particularly with regard to its Nuclear program And Regional activities – is less clear.

The use of military means?

Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants launched a surprise attack on Israel, the United States has shown a growing willingness to take military motion against the Iran-backed groups.

The most notable Air strikes by the USA and Great Britain occurred in February in retaliation for an earlier drone strike by an Iran-backed group that killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan.

To date, Western air strikes were more of a symbolic effect and geared toward curbing the provocations supported by Iran. But they display the military power of the USA and its allies.

In recent years, neither diplomacy, sanctions nor soft power have succeeded in bringing the Iranian leadership back to the negotiating table. The recent Iranian president could proceed down the trail of disengagement, but this runs the chance of the West having to tighten its deterrent measures.

Months of relentless clashes between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah have Mass evacuations of the civilian population And widespread deathInjuries and destruction.

The violence has intensified for the reason that starting of June, accompanied by increasingly heated rhetoricBoth sides have prevented mutual attacks from escalating into full-blown war, recognizing the likely catastrophic consequences. The query is whether or not this fragile containment can hold in the longer term.

In threatening language, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said proposed on 23 June that more of the country's troops would soon be released to maneuver to the north to fight Hezbollah. A couple of days earlier, CNN reported that Israel moved Iron Dome batteries from the south to the north in preparation for a possible war with Hezbollah.

As a Scholar of Lebanon and IsraelI actually have closely followed the domestic political dynamics in each countries.

The stakes are enormous, and the implications, for my part, go far beyond the continuing conflict between Israel and Hamas. The tensions between Hezbollah and Israel have exposed the basic incontrovertible fact that the war in Gaza is in some ways also a war for dominance in the broader Middle East. It risks drawing the United States even deeper into this potential abyss, which could put Washington able to increased diplomatic efforts to maintain the violence between Israel and Hezbollah under control.

Regional dynamics

Hezbollah, a gaggle that is taken into account a proxy for Iran but has its own domestic concerns, risks turning Lebanon right into a War undesirable for many LebaneseAlthough Hezbollah professes solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinian cause, it’s motivated not by the worldwide call for justice for the Palestinians, but fairly by its support for Iran's long-term goal of destroying Israel and establishing a Palestinian state ruled by Hamas.

Iran’s regional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, are closely watching how Iran exploits the Gaza conflict and growing violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border to advance its regional interests. supported by Iran in its war against Ukraine, can be monitoring the conflict and considers it as means weakening the United States.

Israel, then again, is managing the developing crisis on its northern border from a position of accelerating weakness in its struggle for regional dominance with Iran. Critics have accused Israel's far-right government there may be an absence of sufficient strategic eager about the objectives of the present conflict.

Such strategic myopia, they argue, ignores Israel's need to keep up positive relations with its regional and global allies, primarily the United States.

Instead of devastating Gaza after the October 7 massacres by Palestinian militants, Israel's leadership could have used the war to strengthen its relations with the Sunni-majority states within the Middle East and leverage its alliance with the US to secure regional support for the Jewish state. But the Israeli government's stubborn refusal to entertain any ideas about constructive political engagement with the Palestinians is resulting in a drastic erosion of Israel's relations with regional actors who would otherwise be willing to side with the Jewish state against Iran.

Potential for conflict between the US and Iran

A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would likely set all the region ablaze, involving Iran and its proxies, and will also drag the United States right into a direct confrontation with Tehran – a horror scenario that President Joe Biden has been trying to forestall since October 7.

Unlike the war against Hamas – by which American support for Israel is proscribed to diplomacy and arms deliveries – a war with Hezbollah could force the United States to provide concrete combat assistanceas it happened in April as a countermeasure to retaliatory strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.

Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, has even expanded the geographical scope of the conflict by Cyprus threatenedand stated that his organization would attack the island if it cooperated with Israel in the course of the war.

Washington is clearly very concerned about the implications of an escalation of the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Since the primary days of the Gaza war, the US has been attempting to negotiate an Israeli-Lebanese agreement This would mean the withdrawal of Hezbollah troops from the border area and their substitute by international troops and the Lebanese army.

In return, in line with the American proposal, Israel and Lebanon would form a border commission to resolve Lebanese and Israeli grievances in regards to the course of their shared border line once and for all.

But the continuing war of attrition between Hezbollah and Israel is making such an agreement increasingly difficult.

In Israel, pressure from conservative and non secular circles and from residents of the north, the war with Hezbollah is escalating. Current surveys suggest that nearly all of Israeli Jews would welcome the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) going to war against Hezbollah “with all their might”.

The Israeli Defense Forces, then again, are sending contradictory messages. Their spokesman recently delivered an aggressive message: the moment of truth is getting closer regarding the choice to go to war. Meanwhile, senior generals, including the Chief of Staff, have stated that after nine months of fighting the Israeli armed forces are overstretched and exhaustedand the opening of a front against Hezbollah cannot happen before the military receives latest forces and is reorganized.

Israel in a vulnerable situation

As for Netanyahu, who once cold and risk-averse political realist is now risking a scenario that could lead on to a complete strategic defeat for the country and undermine the safety and viability of an Israel integrated into regional politics. great concern since January If Netanyahu believes that an open war with Hezbollah would serve his narrow personal interests, he could force Israel into that war. We could also be nearing the moment when that fear becomes a reality.

Hezbollah, then again, continues to place pressure on Israel, increasing the danger of a full-scale conflagration because it recognizes that Israel could also be in its most vulnerable situation – possibly for the reason that 1948 war.

Given Iran and Hezbollah’s long-term strategic goals of eliminating Israel, continuing this war of attrition actually pays off, even when the worth is still economically and the political decline of Lebanon.

The American And the French – Lebanon's former colonial creator and ruler – has worked hard to seek out diplomatic solutions to the crisis. Hezbollah has said from the outset that it could stop its cross-border shelling if a ceasefire agreement was reached in Gaza.

But at this point, neither Israel nor the Hamas leadership appear to want to achieve that time. In fact, the post-October 7 scenario hoped for by Hamas – that its allies within the so-called Axis of Resistance will enter the war and attack Israel on multiple fronts – only appears to be becoming more likely.

In short, the Lebanese-Israeli border is currently an explosive front that’s susceptible to explosion.

Of course, continued mutual deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah could hold either side back, very similar to mutual assured destruction (MAD) held the US and the Soviet Union back in the course of the Cold War. And the US can be aggressively attempting to put out the flames.

But with no major diplomatic breakthrough, the situation is bound to proceed to simmer and will escalate right into a far deadlier war than the one which has been happening since October 7.